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FISCAL, MONETARY AND ASSOCIATED POLICY IN PRACTICE:
Some Reflections From An Enterprise Perspective
/ * ?
By Reginald Herbold Green
Our own reality - however fine and attractive the reality of 
others may be - can only be transformed by detailed knowledge 
of it, by our own efforts, by our own sacrifices ...
- Amilcar Cabral
A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage has to live in 
even worse conditions while he is rebuilding it and making a 
decent house for himself. In the same way Tanzania has to 
accept the existence of problems which are created by the very 
fact of trying to convert the colonialist and semi-capitalist 
economy we inherited into a nationalist and socialist economy.
- Julius Nyerere
The tree that grows 
There splendidly alone ...
Is Africa, your Africa. It puts forth new shoots 
Wiht patience and stubborness puts forth new shoots.
Slowly its fruits grow to have 
The harsh, strong taste of liberty.
- David Diop
National Frames and Enterprise Actions
Fiscal, monetary, price and foreign exchange policies are inherently macro 
(economy wide) not micro (enterprise controllable). This is true even when 
the role of the state is quite limited - the individual enterprise (unless 
it is so large as to dominate the entire economy or to lead a cartel which 
does so) still faces patterns and positions largely beyond its direct control. 
Planned state control - whatever its theoretical or practical defects - can 
make the nature of the framework easier for an enterprise to comprehend 
and to relate to, thereby increasing its room for manouvre. It may also make 
it easier to identify what changes are likely to be made on what basis - 
a point of some importance since enterprises in almost any system are regularly 
seeking to achieve alternatives in the macro framework as well as ways of
adapting themselves to it.
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The relationship between macro policy frameworks and enterprises is problematic 
both on the enterprise and the state side. Tensions are inevitable - in the 
absence of adequate information and understanding massive confusions and sub­
stantial contradictions vary from endemic to epidemic.
\
Any enterprise will wish to see macro policies altered to facilitate meeting
enterprise goals eg a bottle manufacturer will seek to show that price control
on bottles is unnecessary because the purchasers have real bargaining power
2while a bottle buyer might argue the reverse. Any firm seeking to meet a 
cash flow gap (whether from increased current assets, fixed investment or 
an operating deficit) will want relaxation of credit control (reduced inter­
vention) and lower interest rates (increased intervention). There is no general 
rule of wanting less or more intervention - the general rule is of seeking 
action (whether intervention or the reverse) benefitting the enterprise.
However, enterprises cannot readily do without a macro policy framework. If 
there were no import licensing or credit allocation in Tanzania, a rapid 
breakdown of production, very rapid inflation (by some per cent per day not 
per year) and almost total absence of imports (with unpaid suppliers on "strike") 
would ensue. It is in each enterprises’ interest that its proposal for allo­
cations are favourably treated but not that total allocations are unmanageably 
high, let alone that the Credit and Foreign Exchange budgeting mechanisms be 
scrapped. Even with respect to taxation there are mixed interests. State 
spending creates purchasing power, trained personnel, social stability, intra­
structure - all vital to enterprises. Unless this expenditure is covered by 
taxation and/or foreign grants and soft loans competition for savings rises 
and if the domestic borrowing is too great both a credit famine and an 
instability of prices which increases enterprise problems arise. Therefore, 
it is in enterprise interests that taxation in general covers recurrent 
spending, and that public backed pension and provident cash flows be substan­
tial, however much individual taxes in their impact on enterprise or
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employee cash flow may be seen as detrimental to meeting enterprise objectives 
3whoever sets them.
Enterprises need states - at least normal capitalist and socialist enterprises
do. The Uganda or 1979-81 with magendo as the dominant sub-mode of production
is a vivid demonstration of what the absence of a functioning state with
4operational economic policies means.
But the interaction is two way. States - if there are to be growing volumes 
of real resources to allocate (including to allocate to state revenue via 
taxation and borrowing) - need enterprises. Policies which hamper enterprise 
performance - unless they have compelling gains in other direction - are 
counterproductive. To approve external borrowing to build a factory producing 
an important product, deny it imports of raw materials to operate and import 
the product is a nonsense from a state as well as enterprise (macro as well as 
micro) point of view. A sales tax rate that wipes out the market for a product 
is not just a disaster for the enterprise; it is a negative contribution to 
achieving budgetary balance. Mechanisms for import allocation which are so 
uncertain, short term or delayed as to prevent forward production planning 
hamper enterprises but also other policy (eg price setting which depends
5integrally on capacity utilisation projections ) and overall volume of production.
An 'effective' paper economic policy pattern so constructed as to create 
major general obstacles to enterprise activity is effective only on paper. In 
practice it is self defeating. So, of course, is a paper policy which does 
not include checking to see how enterprises are acting in relation to it.
That leads to catastrophes like the 1976/80 NMC performance whose impact on
food availability, foreign exchange shortages and credit allocation tightening 
6has imposed very heavy costs on all other enterprises - again illustrating 
that lack of supervision and control over enterprises in general may very
- 4 -
well be deeply injurious to the interests of most enterprises.
Getting, Spending, Budgeting: Fiscal Policy and Practice
At the most simple level the purpose of public expenditure is to meet politically
identified priority programme costs in social services (20%), security (20%),
economic services (45%) and administration (15%) on recurrent and capital
7(misleadingly termed development ) account while that of public revenue is 
to cover recurrent expenditure and debt service with a moderate transfer to 
capital account.
In each case the goals are substantially more complex. On the expenditure
side they encompass providing basic public services (primary and adult education,
preventátive and basic curative health, pure water) to all Tanzanians in the
foreseeable future (1990), building up and maintaining infrastructure
(including secondary, vocational and tertiary education) to facilitate growth
of production, financing a portion of production expansion and sustaining the
administrative capacity needed to implement and the security capacity to
protect these goals. Wages and salaries policy cannot be separated from
government expenditure policy both because a third of the recurrent budget
is wages and salaries and because the government scales in practice determine
the parastatal and heavily influence the private sector levels and structures.
The 1980/81 and 1981/82 allocations to subsidies and parastatal transfers
in the recurrent budget relate to the goal of strengthening the financial
base of several key units in the parastatal sector,and of preventing either
their functional collapse or inordinate burdens on the poorest Tanzanians,
8while the exercise is carried out.
On the revenue side the baisc goal of covering true recurrent costs and debt 
repayment from recurrent revenue (met in each year from 1961/62 through 
1978/79,except 1974/75 when recurrent proper and the bulk - but not 100% - 
of debt service were so covered) is qualified by a number of considerations
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as to how to raise the revenue:
1. progressiveness - ie higher percentage overall tax burden on higher
incomes and higher on urban than on rural (achieved overall but not 
necessarily for some parts of the private sector nor - by definition - 
for illegal incomes);
2. feasibility of administration - ie reasonably fully and uniformly 
recoverable from all potential payers (moderately well met with some 
improvement over time via simplification of taxes and strengthening of 
staff);
3. consistency with incentives to produce (probably reasonable overall but
distinctly problematic with respect to certain specific taxes eg 
historically with sliding scale export taxes).
Since independence the proportion of government expenditure to GDP rose 
rapidly to the 30-35% range (20-25% recurrent, 10-15% capital) by about 1970, 
and then fluctuated in that range with declines in crisis and recoveries in 
less constrained years. Revenue followed the same pattern through 1978-79, 
but has since lagged badly as a share of GDP leading - together with security 
expenditure increases - to massive (Sh 1,500-1,750 million per year) recurrent 
deficits.
The unsatisfactory post 1978 position does not relate substantially to runaway 
real resource use by normal recurrent expenditure. Indeed since 1977-78 real 
government recurrent spending (excluding defence and parastatal weakness related 
payments) has been cut back each year. The 1981-82 savings on defence and 
defence related costs have been swallowed by the need for continued NMC related 
sembe subsidy and debt consolidation payments, and new allocations to bridge 
Airways and Railways transition to viable cash flows and capital structures.
On the revenue side the problem arises out of the interaction of the foreign 
exchange crises, the domestic manufacturing sector and the tax structure. The
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largest source of revenue (about 40%) is sales tax on domestic manufactures. 
These require - on average - 20% of pre tax ex-factory price in foreign inputs 
and spares. With the sector now constrained to operate at 35% of capacity (as 
over 60% in 1976-77 and before 1974) and absolute output dropping, the sales tax 
yield for 1981-82 is likely to be Sh 2,000 million below what it would be 
were another Sh 1,000 million available for direct industrial input imports. 
Precisely because the sales tax excludes basic food (for progressivity and 
administrative reasons) and is concentrated on goods whose consumption rises 
faster than real income when real income increases, it is more generally 
vulnerable in a period when real average consuming power per capita falls 
(as it has for urban Tanzanians since 1974 and for rural since 1977-78).
There is no way to balance the recurrent budget by tax increases on current
output levels. Nor can Sh 1,500 million in recurrent expenditure cuts be
achieved. Something can be saved on running down the defence establishment
levels created to face specific Portugese and Aminite threats, but further
cuts on social and economuc services would risk their total collapse while
maintenance and parastatal restructuring expenditure is imprudently low.
The key constraint is foreign exchange - whatever its other problems (and they
are not trivial) the manufacturing sector could produce 50 to 75% more if it
10had the imported spares and production inputs.
Capital (development) expenditure in real terms peaked in 1974. 1980-81 and
1981-82 are marked by sharp falls. Here, however, a case for restructuring 
exists. Building new units would in many cases seem to have lower priority 
for finance or foreign exchange than rehabilitating existing ones (eg in the 
case of trunk roads) and/or securing operating inputs (eg books and drugs 
ahead of new administration buildings and ministry headquarters). This is 
an issue at enterprise level too. Texco desperately needs complete reequip­
ment of one mill and substantial reequipment of three. It has a complete mill 
useable as soon as power becomes available and two more proceeding (badly 
behind schedule) to completion. It has output constraints related to imported
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spares and chemicals. Do its plans for new mills make either macro national 
or micro enterprise sense at this point? Are not the priorities: reequipment 
especially at Kiltex-Dar and Urafiki, enhanced spares capacity (whether in 
Texco or - eg - in National Foundry) and higher imports of chemicals, spares 
and any operating input which can generate additional exports substantially 
greater than the import (eg polyester fibre for the Morogoro mill)? To build 
new capcity for which imported inputs are lacking at the expense of spares 
and replacement machinery for existing units and more inputs to push them back 
toward capacity appears an odd choice, either at macro or micro level - a point 
made in the Survival Programme but far from fully internalised by investing 
bodies (government, parastatal or private).
Certain aspects of the tax system are of special interest to companies. The 
first is company tax which at 50% basic and relatively few special provisions 
is above world average but by no means uniquely high. Depreciation of 
fixed assets (other than residential and certain other buildings11) is 100% 
basic plus 25% initial allowance (for a total of 125%) on major new (and 
potentially overall reequipment) investment in manufacturing and tourism.
The 25% is discretionary, but usually granted on cases which fall within the 
qualifying provisions.
Import duty rates are lower on inputs into further production and on capital
goods. They exist at all on these items in practice to serve as an incentive
to buy Tanzanian when possible and as a tax on the use of foreign exchange,
and in principle also as a means to limit resource misallocation which could
12occur from import duties only on final consumer goods. Shifts in the pattern 
- to and from zero rating on some inputs and capital goods - have created 
problems in enterprise forward (or annual for the inputs) planning.
Sales Tax is normally zero on capital goods, inputs into further production 
(including here the registered dealers’ status as well as rates proper) and
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exports. For minor inputs or ones not directly embodied in final products
tax is often payable, but can in practice be passed on, and is low relative to
turnover. Sales tax is basically a consumption tax on a once for all basis
13.(thus registered dealer status).
Exemptions, drawbdacks, etc are very limited in number and extent. In practice 
they are available to some degree to cover initial construction/operation period 
if there is an initial cash flow problem. Otherwise special rates are related 
to user - not producer - enterprise needs eg tea chests and safety equipment 
are zero rated. The first is a simple case of an input (as it happens an 
input into exports) and the second of interest to minimise costs of protecting 
workers.
The last two examples illustrate two problems: some tax officers are too con­
cerned with protecting revenue and some companies not very careful at reading 
relevant legislation. In a case in which tea chests were taxed, the purchasing 
company's complaints (oddly the selling company did not protest) did not 
include the key point that there is a specific Sales Tax schedule heading 
clearly marked Free! Similarly, a leather safety glove and gauntlet company 
happily paid (or at any rate collected) sales tax at 25% for some years (either 
from 1969 or its date of initially manufacturing the items) and only protested 
when the change of rate to 75% in 1980 threatened its sales, Yet the General
Exemption schedule covers safety equipment in clear language, and was never
14cited - even in 1980 when a tax change was sought.
Remission, drawback, recovery of indirect tax on exports works badly, partly 
because it is complex, partly because customs’ laudable desire to protect revenue 
tends to defeat the objective of actual making refunds when due, partly because 
many enterprises procedures and records are not what they might be, and their 
export volume does not justify separate systems for export sales. Only the 
Sales Tax exemption on the export itself seems to work well.
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Here enterprises might consider seeking a simplification by approximation pro­
cedure - a 2¿% or 5% (categorised by product) refund on the FOB value of exports as 
stated in one of the forms which already must be filed with Customs or the 
Bank of Tanzania. In most cases this would approximate tax embodied and the 
procedure would be simple, intelligble and presumably workable.
Overall, from an enterprise point of view, the Tanzania tax system is relatively 
certain and simple, but also relatively high and enforced. Given marked con­
ditions and the fact the indirect tax costs are acceptable components in 
calculations for Price Commission purposes (and the return on assets formula 
subsumes a 50% basic company tax) the tax burden is shiftable reducing this 
disadvantage.
Arguably taxes borne by enterprise employees cause more problems than those
directly on the firm. Expatriates are a special case - the income tax structure
deliberately makes them expensive (while other discretionary powers provide
certain exemptions for the firm's benefit) to the firm to encourage training,
and offset the widespread implicit prejudice for foreign over citizen
personnel. Beyond that the combination of relatively high and progressive
15income taxes, high sales taxes and low allowed rates of wage and salary
increase may affect employee incentives and morale. However, the underlying
problems is the production constraint - lower taxes would mean more inflation
(just as bad for morale) or collapse of (inter-alia) health, education, and
transport (even worse for morale and directly affecting production/distribution/
16procurement as well). Were real purchasing power per capita rising, the 
present tax system would not be inconsistent with incentives to win promotion 
or bonuses and morale would be substantially higher. The problem is very real
indeed but tax reduction is no answer.
Plannel Allocation: Credit, Investment, Foreign Exchange, Prices
Monetary policy as usually defined is of direct micro interest to enterprises
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as it raises interest costs or freezes them out of the credit market by other 
devices. It is of macro and indirect micro interest as its impact affects 
rates of price changes (including what the market will bear for their goods) 
and general economic conditions (especially the market for their product).
By and large it turns on interest rate and money supply (or in less crude 
versions domestic credit formation) policy.
In Tanzania these aspects of policy are best looked at in terms of (bank)
Annual Credit Planning since interest rate policy is determined largely on
other grounds, including the inflationary impact of raising the cost of
working capital - "good" for perhaps a 10% increase in the cost of living if
the overdraft rate were raised to 30 to 40% to make it in the range of 5 to
1710% above inflation (ie 5 to 10% real). However, related allocation 
policies - on credit other than bank, foreign exchange and prices - need to 
be seen together with the Annual Credit Plan to ascertain the overall impact 
on enterprises.
Bank credit (NBC and B0T) is through the Annual Credit Plan. This Plan 
forms part of the annual planning exercise and is carried out by the Bank of 
Tanzania in consultation with Finance and Planning with most enterprise or 
enterprise category data supplied by NBC.
The process is iterative to fit acceptable domestic credit expansion with 
workable allocations to enterprises. The broad availability estimate is 
expected real growth in monetised GDP, plus expected unavoidable inflation, 
eg 5% GDP growth plus 15% imported and non-money supply related inflation 
would yield a 20% target.
The broad guideline for government bank borrowing used to be a) increase in 
currency circulation plus b) one quarter of increase in deposits. In fact, 
except in the 1974/75 and 1978/79 to date crisis years, this rule of thumb level
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has not been reached. The 1978/79 and subsequent borrowing not only exceeds 
the guideline but is largely for recurrent deficits.
The Credit Planning mechanism has performed unevenly. Over 1970/71 - 1974/75 
it was fairly effective but over 1975/76 - 1978/79 the Bank of Tanzania (then 
the secretariat with Planning nominally in overall charge) appeared to pay less 
attention to the exercise, and especially performance. More endemic have been 
problems of quarterly ceilings because while both government and enterprise 
demand for credit is seasonal, the seasonal patterns vary by borrower and are 
not very stable between years. A weakness which developed over 1976/77 - 
1978/79 was failure to inquire closely into endemic (in some cases, notably 
NMC, epidemic) over-borrowers - a sharp contrast with 1970/71 - 1973/74, when 
the initial STC over-borrowing pattern which precipitated implementation of 
the 1969/74 Planning exercise's proposals for credit planning, meant that 
close attention was paid to major "over-borrowers". The combination of 
these three weaknesses has at times led to credit freezes or squeezes (eg 
late 1980) even for enterprises within their limits.
How well the exercise relates to particular enterprise requirements depends 
heavily on how well the relevant NBC and C o m m i s s i o n e r  for Public Investment Officers 
know the enterprises projected needs for the ensuing year. (They cannot 
know them if the enterprise does not, or if it does not inform them). It 
also relates to how tight the overall ceiling is, and how important the 
enterprise is perceived as being.
Investment bank credit is not planned in detail centrally (or even for the 
investment banks as a group). In broad outline it relates to the overall 
annual planning exercise and the financial institution annual plans as 
approved by CPI,but individual loans are not pre-allocated by enterprise 
in nearly as much detail as commercial bank credit. This is partly because 
investment bank credit to public sector enterprises usually forms part of a
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package including a Development (capital) Budget Loan or equity injection
18(frequently mistitled grant ) and therefore is in support of an "approved" 
use, and partly because TIB has usually had r e s ou rce s available (at least in 
shillings) in excess of acceptable loan proposals.
At present this excess is related in part to lack of foreign exchange - with 
about two thirds of the total direct and indirect cost of fixed investment 
foreign exchange cost, purely domestic finance does not make possible invest­
ment at macro level without more exports or foreign finance nor at micro 
(enterprise) level without high foreign exchange allocations or foreign 
finance. A somewhat similar constraint explains the very low rate of commercial 
bank credit expansion to the manufacturing and commercial sectors.
19Short and medium term foreign borrowing (supplier credit broadly defined) 
requires approval by the Bank of Tanzania. For parastatals it also requires 
government approval as the preferred channels are via government or an invest­
ment bank. If - as is common - a bank guarantee is required, then NBC approval 
(ie agreeing whether and on what terms it will guarantee) is also necessary.
This area has been one of distinct uncertainty, unclarity and unpromptness.
Over 1978/79 - 1980/81 levels of short term supplier credit approved were
suchas to mortgage a substantial portion of 1981/82 - 1988/89 export earnings.
Most of these projects seem unlikely to generate foreign exchange savings or
earnings adequate to cover the foreign exchange servicing costs, and many
require increased imports to be operated. Similarly BOT and NBC approvals
have been sequential not in parallel, leading to unnecessary delay in being
20able to conclude agreements to borrow.
The 1981 BOT guidelines should improve control over borrowing and enable 
enterprises to anticipate the probability of approval. In practice it seems 
unlikely that short term credits other than inputs into exports, high export
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content plants and minor gap filling credits to complete projects largely 
financed in longer and softer terms can prudently be approved, given the 
medium term trade imbalance and grant/soft loan projections.
Enterprise annual plans (and related past and current year accounts) covering 
physical and financial budgets on recurrent (profit and loss) and capital (fixed 
and current asset) account are legally required by parastatals. If this legal 
provision was enforced, it would provide a focus for coordinating overall para­
statal financing, foreign exchange and price requirements at micro and public 
enterprise sectoral levels. At present the law is widely - by no means 
universally - ignored; in many cases because enterprises cannot, or cannot 
be bothered, to budget for the coming year. That cause is even more depressing 
than its symptoms of unlawful nonfiling since such an enterprise cannot 
possibly operate efficiently, nor can its requirements be handled plausibly 
in any of the annual macro-allocation processes.
The Development (fixed capital) Budget is a major channel for allocating invest­
ment finance. Like the Annual Credit Plan it is an iterative exercise (under 
Planning direction with Treasury and in some respects BOT participation). 
Considerable problems have arisen for six reasons:
a. regular misperception of how fast a project could be implemented leading 
to annual underspending;
b. equally regular underestimation of total costs leading to major over­
spending on most projects by time of completion;
c. consequential problems in ensuing adequacy of allocations to multi year 
projects once begun, and to estimating "room” for new starts;
d. overconcentration on new projects even when renovation or replacement 
would offer better results;
e. lack of coordination with working capital (bank credit) and foreign
exchange (operating input) allocation procedures leading to unutilisable 
21capacity;
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f. weak coordination of related project timing leading to the power and
water availability problems plaguing (in particular) Musoma, Mwanza and 
22Mbeya.
With increased scarcity of resources since 1974, and especially since 1978, 
the operational impact of these weaknesses has become more severe. In each 
case the problem lies at least as much on the enterprise side (whence came 
the original data and proposals) as on that of the Ministry of Planning.
Recurrent Budget allocations are either operating subsidies (usually paid to 
the enterprise but designed to benefit all or specifiedusers , eg sembe, 
fertilizer) or capital restructuring allocations. For 1981/82 these total 
about Sh 1,500 million. As the capital restructuring tends to be replacing 
past losses it too represents a transfer payment from taxpayer to enterprise, 
and is likely to take the form of a grant. This source of funds can only be 
interim and bridging. If it becomes open ended current losss cover rather 
than salvaging an enterprise threatened by past losses while it returns to 
surplus, the macro effect via the government borrowing or taxing requirement 
will be unsustainable,and all enterprises other than recipients of the grants 
will suffer heavily from higher taxes and/or inflation rates.
Foreign exchange bedgeting is half yearly (within an annual plan) with basic 
responsibility at BOT. The process - which dates to 1971 - is basically an 
iterative one of reconciling supply and demand estimates. On an annual basis 
this introduces a bias toward cutting imports, since export boosting measures 
tend not to increase foreign exchange supply significantly in the first year 
of implementation.
The basic problem with the system's operation at present is inadequate 
foreign exchange to meet minimum import requirements to operate the economy 
at tolerable short term levels of capacity utilisation, and to maintain
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existing capital stocks. Under these circumstances there are no "correct" 
or "good" choices open to the BOT, only "least unsound" and "least bad" and the 
type of strain this imposes is conducive to making decisions which are even 
less satisfactory than that.
A series of other problems aggravate the u n d e r l y i n g  shortage*s impact on all 
enterprises:
a. gross overstatement of "needs" by most firms forcing the BOT to recal­
culate or "play crossword puzzles", either of which reduces efficiency 
of final allocations for most enterprises;
b. an especially serious variant of "a" with respect to spares and replace­
ment machinery where BOT's ability to recalculate with any pretense at 
accuracy is negligible, leading to problems such as the 1980 'Christmas 
present' of a brewery breakdown;
c. procedures (by the BOT and by user enterprises) making estimation of 
licenses outstanding and bills to come on licenses already used at the 
beginning of a period, and their projection for its close, very difficult 
with resultant deviations in actual import related requirements during
a period from projections based on that period's allocations;
d. increasing burden of repayment of supplier credit;
e. weak export earnings projections (related to terms of trade and transport
problems, but also to past limited enterprise and BOT interest in exports 
beyond the main export crops);
f. weaknesses in effective relation of separate import allocations to
export sales (and in checking ex post that the exports eventuated) as 
well as inadequate priority to such allocations.
With negligible reserves, uncertain receipts and worsening terms of trade (now 
about 50 to a base of 100 in 1972 and a brief peak of about 115 in 1976-77) 
the system is uncertain, unstable (with brief semi relaxations eg July- 
December 1980 all too speedily reversed) and late (ie allocations for the
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half years are now made up to 45 days into the six months rather than 45 days 
before, and no tentative forward allocation indications for the following 
half year are practicable) both from enterprise and from macro economic manage­
ment viewpoints.
Price management affects borrowing because it affects eneterprise cash flow, 
and therefore the amount of working capital and fixed investment requiring 
finance from outside the firm. One of the Price Commission's statutory goals 
is to ensure adequate levels of investible surplus for reasonably efficiently 
run enterprises.
This goal - moderately well met during most years over 1973-78 - has become 
much harder to fulfill recently:
a. given foreign exchange allocation - and related transport availability -
uncertainties, annual projection of rate of capacity utilisation for
23manufacturing enterprises is well nigh impossible;
b. because unit costs are highly sensitive to volume, this makes surplus 
(or loss) at any approved price highly uncertain for reasons beyond the 
enterprise's control;
c. similar problems - albeit probably of less magnitude - arise because of
the increased rate of inflation which may tend to result in underestimation 
of cost increases during the year to which the domestic product price 
ceilings apply.
For enterprises as a group, the Price Commission probably raises manufacturers' 
real (price deflated) surplus relative to the commercial sector's (and especially 
the retail sub-sector's). This was intially the result of the P C ’s pre-history 
when opportunistic retail price hikes played a large part in its creation.
More recently, it relates to the probability of "free market" prices under 
conditions of extreme scarcity leading to 75-200% annual inflation, with 
manufacturers' prices likely to be the slowest to adjust and their opportunities
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to act as 'entrepreneurs of adversity" lowest relative to retailers and sub­
wholesalers .
Interest rates (an input price from an enterprise point of view) either affect 
earned surplus or output prices. At present they are at least 10% below the 
rate of inflation (ie negative by 10%) as opposed to 1 to 2% above it in the 
later 1960's, and about equal to it in from mid-1975 through mid-1978.
The impact on use of borrowed funds is relatively low for two reasons. First, 
most borrowing ceilings are set by allocation or by lender estimation of credit 
worthiness, and not by enterprise "desire to borrow". Second, many enterprise 
bank credit ceilings are underdrawn because of lack of inputs to operate at 
or near capacity in which case additional borrowing is pointless (given the 
absence of enterprise ability to earn as much as the overdraft rate on their 
liquid assets).
However, a minus 10% real interest rate is distributionally unsound. It 
penalizes savers - including efficient enterprises with large net deposit 
account balances - and subsidizes badly performing firms with high credit 
limits. The problems with raising the rate to 25-35% (positive by - say - 
5%) are however even worse:
a. a massive increase in the government debt service bill;
b. a massive increase in working capital costs;
c. and thus highly inflationary pressures via enterprise need for price 
increases to meet this cost push inflation and government need to borrow 
more (or raise indirect taxes compounding the cost push element).
With an inflation rate cut to 15% and declining and a recurrent budget approach­
ing balance, a restructuring to - say - 10-13% overdraft, 12-16% investment 
bank (and government lending to parastatals), 7-10% government debt might be 
practicable without rekindling inflation, and with some reason to believe a
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neutral or positive true interest rate pattern would result. As of 1981 
these conditions are far from being met.
Coordination - as noted in the section on enterprise (parastatal) annual plans - 
of all of these credit, price and foreign exchange allocation budgets is weak 
at micro and at macro level. Except for the suppliers’ credit binge of 1979-81, 
this has probably been more apparent than real , and serious in only a limited 
number of cases, on the different credit sources side, but - since 1978 - 
serious in respect to credit/price/foreign exchange interaction (or non­
interaction) .
In 1981 - A Resume
The basic fiscal and bank credit policies as they affect enterprises are 
relatively simple, transparent and predictable. The same used to be true of 
foreign exchange and price allocations. Greater uncertainty has surrounded 
long term capital allocations (eg investment banks, development budget).
As of 1981 the situation is substantially worse. On occasion bank credit 
is not predictable. Foreign exchange allocations and, therefore, the surplus 
achievable meaning of any price are highly unpredictable and much less simple 
or transparent than before. (A situation complicated by the increased offering, 
paying and receiving of bribes and similar payments). This increases the prob­
lems flowing from non-coordination at micro and macro level of credit (and 
government equity), foreign exchange and price allocations.
It is critical to separate problems basically external to monetary - credit - 
foreign exchange - price allocation from those internal to the present patterns 
of operation. Otherwise, substantial scarce time and energy will be deployed 
fruitlessly on changing procedures and policies, in a vain attempt to influence 
causes external to procedures and policies.
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The underlying cause is foreign exchange shortage. To the extent foreign 
exchange allocation procedures and non-workable tax refund procedures have 
constrained/deterred exports, this can be influenced by fiscal and foreign 
exchange allocation priority, policy, procedure shifts. But - while in no 
way changing the need to act promptly on those fronts now that export growth 
has been squarely prioritised as critical to both self reliance and survival - 
such measures cannot by any plausible estimation close the minimum demand/ 
maximum supply gap on import/export account at reasonable levels of operation of 
the economy over the next three years.
The Recurrent Budget deficit is largely consequential on the foreign exchange
constraint via the loss of potential sales tax on domestic manufacturers
resulting from 35% versus 60% of capacity production. It cannot be closed at
present real output levels, because to do so would require cuts in expenditure
inconsistent with continued functioning of basic components of public services
(including ones critical to enterprises) or cuts in personal consumption that
would probably be both politically unacceptable and, in any event, not actually
24enforceable by fiscal measures.
I
A series of procedural problems have been cited in respect of specific 
allocation mechanisms. Three stand out as fairly general:
a. inadequate data flow from enterprises to BOT CPI-Planning either to
allow reasonably informed macro-allocation guidelines or to operate
such guidelines fully equitably or effectively with respect to particular 
25enterprises;
b. inadequate enterprise understanding of macro priorities, guidelines and 
procedures, often even when they are reasonably simple and by no means 
secret;
c. lack of coordination of allocations (credit, equity, foreign exchange,
prices) in respect to major enterprises because the parastatal annual 
plans are not being submitted in a majority of cases and even when
- 20 -
submitted do not seem to be used as a means to testing consistency of 
subsequent allocations with each other, and with the enterprise plan 
(either as approved or as consistently amended in the light of resource 
constraints).
What Is To Be Done? - Some Notes
In the context of fiscal and credit-foreign exchange-price allocation several 
steps appear to be possible which would, to a degree, loosen the underlying 
foreign exchange constraint, and also increase the effectiveness of the 
allocation process at any level of foreign exchange availability. A number 
of them require initiatives at enterprise level, some of which are briefly 
noted here.
Import substitution on a systematic basis beginning with enterprise identifi­
cation of operating inputs, spares, personnel, construction inputs and services 
(eg industrial consultancy, building) which could be procured domestically.
The second step would be deciding whether enterprise production or purchase 
from other enterprises would be more suitable. Parallel to this should be 
enterprise and sectoral (eg by Mechanical and Engineering Development Industries 
Association) of what capacity to produce import substitutes exists, and 
informing potential buyers - and exercise in which TIB might take a role at 
encouragement and data exchange level.
Opportunities are not negligible eg TISCO has 'spare' capacity in certain types 
of services as do several MEDIA members in respect of spares and engineering 
inputs into construction. On operating inputs Tanzania Breweries partial 
substitution of sorghum for barley, and action to identify how to grow or 
encourage others (eg Tanzania Wattle?) to grow barley is an example of what 
can be done.
The relevance to the policies under consideration is that such action would
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require credit (and in some - not all - cases price increases) for buyer and/or 
producer. Clearly demonstrated and costed import substitution cases should 
(and probably if presented as such would) receive priority for bank and invest­
ment bank credit within existing procedures. In respect to foreign exchange 
allocation procedural changes (for input content) might be needed, but cannot 
be identified until a number of cases requiring special attention have been 
brought.
Parallel considerations apply to exports. Most enterprises have not seriously 
considered what they could export nor what their marginal/incremental costs
are to identify the export prices needed for improved overall financial
26performance. Nor have they considered in detail what data on external 
markets (and which ones) and what promotion (direct or via a specialist 
export company) they would need to achieve actual sales. Until this is done 
more widely, rebates, export promotion funding and foreign exchange allocations 
for inputs cannot produce satisfactory results.
However, here procedural changes are needed:
a. an effective, prompt indirect tax recovery system for exports - preferably
one providing a "deemed" refund of 2^% or 5% of the FOB value for exports 
of predefined categories of goods paid on presentation of a copy of one
of the forms now required for Customs and/or Exchange Control purposes;
b. more priority to separate foreign exchange allocations for inputs required
to produce exports, plus some observable preference to firms achieving 
enhanced exports in respect to general foreign exchange allocations;
c. specific consideration of working capital requirements of increased 
production for exports in setting enterprise bank credit plan ceilings.
Better data collection and application at enterprise level is needed:
a. to reduce need for outside finance (by raising internal cash flow);
b. to lower avoidable losses of real resources;
- 22 -
c. to allow coherent enterprise annual budgeting/planning;
d. to provide a firm foundation for use in macro level annual planning.
One sub-area is in accounting and auditing viewed as management tools for 
projecting, guiding and reducing cost of enterprise activities. The most 
immediate loosers from inadequate (including late) accounts are the enterprises 
themselves.
A related area is systematic following through of the implications and 
requirements of major decisions not leaving gaps which erode the whole.
Eg SUDECO's emergency procurement of additional godcwn space in 1981 was 
necessary. Probably the only large enough premises were privately owned.
Rental (which would have rendered the godown subject to compulsory acquisition 
at a low price under the 1971 legislation) was not practicable. The price 
paid - taking into account present construction costs - was not self evidently 
grossly excessive. But the failure to consider squarely how best to achieve 
needed repairs (probably by SUDECO buying "as is" and immediately undertaking 
the repairs itself or hiring a contractor) rendered the entire exercise 
'productive' of spoiled sugar and unwelcome publicity/demands on management 
time rather than of additional, useable storage capacity.
To interact with the policies considered in this paper, several steps beyond 
enterprise collection and internal use are needed:
1. serious enterprise attention to filing parastatal annual planning data 
in the form legally required;
2. consolidation of basic CPI, Planning, Parent Ministry, BOT, NBC, Investment 
Bank, Price Commission, data requirements on a single form to save 
duplicate form preparation time, and to facilitate coordination among
the recipients. Additional data would be needed by some of the users 
(eg NBC, Price Commission, Investment Banks), but consolidation and 
standardisation of the common data requirements would represent a
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significant time saving;
3. use of the enterprise annual plan submission exercise - both by enterprise 
and government bodies - as a means to check the consistency of proposals 
for and allocations of credit (and government capacity) of foreign exchange 
and of prices;
4. to use these micro inputs in formulation of macro annual plan allocations 
(especially in respect of bank credit, investment bank credit, government 
capital budget and foreign exchange budget.
These steps would - among other things - allow more realistic assessment of 
operating input requirements for foreign exchange by the Bank of Tanzania since 
the request could be related to physical and financial operating targets. In 
response to spares and replacement machinery further procedural changes could 
be needed. A start might include:
a. requiring from enterprises an 'engineering' statement to justify claimed 
spares and replacement machinery for which foreign exchange allocations 
are sought;
27b. use by BOT of TISCO as an agent to provide expert review and advice on 
the allocations requests and their technical justification (on a desk study 
basis when possible, but if necessary, by actual inspection at the enterprise).
This would not be perfect, but should break the present impasse of gross over­
requests for allocations facing total lack of BOT technical capability to 
evaluate them to arrive at a possible, and reasonably prudent, level of macro 
allocations, let alone micro allocations, to enterprise.
For enterprises to receive intelligent understanding of their problems by CPI, 
Treasury more generally, BOT, NBC, TIB, Parent Ministries or Planning they must 
provide data on a regular basis to enable the recipients to build up a working 
knowledge of the enterprises as micro inputs into macro policy determination. 
Coming only when facing a crisis to institutions otherwise left uninformed
- 24 -
cannot be very productive. Nor are written submissions enough. The more 
successful enterprises (public and private sector) maintain ongoing contact 
with officers in these bodies on whose schedules their enterprises fall for the 
very good reason that an established relationship based on exchange of information 
speeds up response to requests and improves the quality of decisions from both 
parties point of view.
However, in many cases the government side also needs to improve procedures.
Several parent ministries (and in some cases NBC and BOT) do not have officers 
responsible for maintaining working knowledge of enterprises falling within 
their sectors nor effective systems for reading, analysing, filing and retrieving 
data when submitted. In other cases - eg CPI - the system exists, but evidently 
lacks adequate numbers of qualified personnel to work properly. Enterprises 
(and TIB on their behalf) can legitimately point to the need for substantial 
improvement here if and when they actually do provide adequate information.
These proposals do not include a systematic integration of the credit - foreign 
exchange - price allocation planning mechanisms. Such an exercise is needed 
but requires:
a. better micro data flows from more enterprises plus better use by recipients;
b. additional accounting and financial mangement capacity in enterprises and
receipients to produce and handle the micro data;
c. a study on how coordination could be achieved without major additional time
or personnel constraints (a study the most concerned bodies - CPI, 
Planning, BOT, NBC - might consider contracting to TIB as an expert 
consultant with a working knowledge of both government and enterprise 
capacities and requirements);
d. clear guidelines, clearly understood by all participants before the 
changes are introduced to reduce transitional difficulties to a minimum.
For the immediate future the more modest proposals for improved operation
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within the existing framework could lead to very substantial micro and macro 
efficiency gains. They cannot in themselves surmount the present economic 
crisis nor the constraints it imposes on fiscal and monetary policy. They can 
make a substantial contribution to reducing the costs imposes by those con­
straints and a moderate one to loosening them by reducing total foreign exchange 
demand/increasing supply and lowering total credit requirements.
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Notes
1. The views expressed are those of Professor Green and are not necessarily
the same as those of the Bank of Tanzania, Ministry of Planning or Treasury
to which he is from time to time consultant.
2. In this case the seller is probably correct unless a practice of very high 
prices on medium size orders hampers small enterprise buyers.
3. Even a public sector enterprise will have a surplus as well as other 
targets. These are harder to meet if key employees cannot be recruited 
or are dissatisfied.
4. See R.H.Green, The Political Economy of Magendo, IDS, (Sussex), Discussion 
Paper, 1981, for fuller exposition,
5. The standard Price Commission approach, explicitly in manufacturing and 
implicitly in commerce.
6. The loss of Sh. 2,000million plus reduces allowable bank credit to other
enterprises and places additional demand pressure on unchanged supplies; 
the loss of 500,000 tonnes of food over 1977-79 causes the 1980/81
and 1981/82 maize imports and thereby lower foreign exchange availabilities.
7. Fixed investment may or may not promote development; the same is true for 
recurrent expenditure. In some key sectors - eg agriculture, education, 
health - the recurrent requirements on the government budget far exceed 
the fixed investment ones. Further, for enterprises working capital 
(current asset) investment is usually as critical and sometimes as large 
or (in services) larger than fixed investment. To style a fixed invest­
ment budget "development" is an intellectually antiquated, colonial relic.
8. To achieve breakeven in sembe in 1981/82 would have required a near quad­
rupling not doubling of price; to allow Tanzania Railways to be halted
by insolvency would cause a collapse of the transport system.
9. This estimate includes Sales Tax on Petroleum products which are sometimes 
classed as Sales Tax on Imports.
10. The other weaknesses are themselves in part the result of diverting scarce 
managerial, technical and artisanal time to keeping going at all given 
import constraints with less attention to, and poorer performance in 
respect of, other problems.
11. Logically all buildings should be depreciable. Whether this would sub­
stantially alter enterprise results is rather doubtful.
12. "In principle" only as at present import licensing protects far more than 
any likely tariff level would.
13. ie, it is not a multiple stage "value added tax" with complex sequential 
payment and recovery provisions.
14. Clearly, there are failings on the Tax Officer side here too but it was 
the Treasury, not the enterprise, who finally spotted the error.
15. Except for the private sector, enterprise wage and salary scales are 
regulated to achieve a degree of public sector uniformity. Doubtless 
some salary boosts by juggling titles are achieved but probably not for 
significant numbers of employees. Private enterprises do pay more in 
some categories (and do make dubiously legal increases) presumably to
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lure away scarce technical/professional personnel whose training has been 
paid for by the state or parastatals. In this case the public enterprises' 
interest is in greater state intervention to deter poaching or to regulate 
private sector salaries and higher wages more effectively.
16. This is not the same as constant price Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
Terms of Trade loss (18% over 1976-81), added defence spending, "lost 
grain" need to be deducted first. On that basis 1980 per capita real 
purchasing power was probably 15% below 1978.
17. That is a 5 to 10% annual increase in the purchasing power of the combined 
principal plus interest.
18. Only on Recurrent Budget account are there grants or operating subsidies. 
The problem arises because of the lag in Treasury specifying the loan
or equity nature of the transfers and setting interest rates and repayment 
periods for the loans.
19. The point is not who lends but that the loan is fairly short (normally 
3 to 10 years with under 2 years grace), tied to particular purchases 
from a particular supplier, at interest rates (say 7 to 10%) showing 
there is a seller or government subsidy element (the true rate for a 
bank loan of this type to a Tanzanian enterprise would now exceed 20%).
20. Granted there should have been less approvals. But once approval is 
decided upon it is desirable to reduce cost overruns by getting the 
goods in and the project in hand rather than playing sequential games 
of snakes and ladders.
21. In practice the working capital constraint from non-coordination has rarely 
been serious.
22. Here the errors are primarily at enterprise level. In particular both 
Texco and Tanesco should have contacted each other and kept in touch 
during construction of the Musoma and Mbeya textile mills and of the 
power facilities to service them.
23. This is true even for key firms receiving - supposedly - preferential 
treatment eg TCC (for revenue reasons) and General Tyre.
24. Radically higher taxes at present would almost certainly lead to augmented 
inflation and evasion on a scale cancelling most of the gains.
25. Without believable and accurate (or in some cases any serious) data on
past and current performance linked to serious forward enterprise budgets,
it is not possible to allocate effectively to one firm. When this 
situation is pervasive, the data base for macro allocation becomes almost 
equally dubious on the demand side.
26. Any price above incremental cost on additional export sales improves
enterprise profit and loss results so long as it is not at the expense
of existing sales at higher (or equal) prices. Thus in present conditions 
of capacity underutilisation export sales below average cost (and domestic 
selling price) would pay most enterprises if the import content were made 
available on special additional allocations so that domestic sales were 
not reduced.
27. TISCO has some engineering and technical personnel capacity but is under­
utilised.
